# VIETNAM

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ANTI-WAR UNITED FRONT SHAPING UP IN SOUTH VIET NAM CITIES

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# Nixon's "Vietnamization" POLICY IS DOOMED TO FAILURE

Nois program-speech of Nov. 3, 1060, President Nixon delined his Viet Nam policy as follows: "We can persist in our search for a just peace through a negotiated settlement if possible, or through continued impleviet negotiated settlement in the New Yestamization." He stressed that that plan "will bring he war to an end regardless of what happens on the negotiating front."

Thus, the keystone of his policy is "Vietnamization" of what he calls the "search for peace."

COROLLARY OF NI-XON'S DOCTRINE

A CCORDING to Mr Nixon, the "Vietnamization" policy stems from his "new" global strategy, from that famous "Nixonian doctrine" regarding Asia, which can be put in a nrtshell as follows:

i.—"The United States will keep all its treaty commitments." In other words it means to pursue its search for world hegemony, maintain its positions everywhere, and prop up US-pail neo-colonialist regimes.

2-"We (the US) shall provide a shield if a nuclear power threatens the freedom

of a nation allied with us or of a nation whose survival we consider vital to our security". This is the usual nuclear blackmail aimed at bullying the national liberation movements, alleged to be loyal to a foreign "nuclear naver."

cases involving

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Applied to Viet Nam, the "Nixonian doctrine" is named "Vietnamization." This means first that Nixon's

Viet Nam policy does not relinquish any of its objectives. The US intends to the US

SUBSTANCE, STAGES AND PURPOSE OF "VIET-NAMIZATION"

DEFINING the word

"Victummization" SeMelvil Laird said on Sept.
26, 1969: "Victuamization when the moneans—a let more than modernization of the South Wietnamese armed forces to perspitability. Victuamization means the progressive transfer to the South Victuamese of responsibility for all aspects of the war and management of their affairs: or economy, stronger military forces, stronger military forces and scurity."

(Continued page 2)

### South Viet Nam

In this issue:

In the First Week of 1970

### PLAF Attacks Stepped Up in Da Nang — Chu Lai Area, Mekong Delta and Western High Plateaux

- In 3 Days, Over 100 Bases and Positions between Da Nang and Quang Ngai Stormed, 900 Enemy Troops Put out of Action.
- Cam Zoi Base Overrun, 400 US "Marine" Casualties, Important Enemy Malerial Losses (6 Jan.).
- In My The Province, a Puppet Company and 300 Soldiers Knocked out of Action; 150 Others Routed in Chau Doc Province.

Processing of azolla pinnata, a green compost, at Hai Anh co-operative, Hai Hau district, Nam Ha province.



## NIXON'S "VIETNAMIZATION" POLICY IS DOOMED TO FAILURE

Thus Vietnamization implies not only a reinforce-ment of the puppet army into one capable of replacing the US troops, but also and hiefly complidation of the neo-colonial regime into one capable of subduing people and drawing subdition the them the resources sary to keep going the war machine. In fact, since the beginning of last year, the US has act to the equipping and intensive training of the puppet army. Meanwhile, it has been striving to striving to Khiem regime with the group, stepping up the "accelerated pacification" campaign to clear the areas still under its control. rounding up youths and pressganging them into the army and levying new taxes.

Such a program cannot be completed in a short period of time, especially the relief of US troops by the puppet army, without running the risk of altering the relations of forces. Testifying before the Senate Foreign Relation Committee. M. Laird thinks that a "US transitional force" about 250,000 men will remain it outh Viet Nam to support the puppet army till 1971 and will be replaced the following year by a US thousand sers". These stages being envisaged in the most propitions conditions there is every prospect of a prolonga tion of the presence of US

The purpose of that relief plan is multiple in the immediate future, the limit US direct commitment in Viet Nam to keep down American casualties and war expenditures at a level ac ceptable to the American public. The human and public. The human and material losses of the US in Viet Nam are at the bottom

inflation, sogring cost o living, social troubles and the weakening of its posianti-war movement in the US has taken such proportions as never seen in the history of that country. To lacate popular discontent begun the withdrawal "by dribblets" of US troops and announced a "Vietnamizaannounced a "Victnamiza-tion" plan. At the same time the plan aims at secur-ing at the conference table "position of strength" dictate its conditions, other-The talks in Paris only the US to prosecute the war till victory. It is still nur-turing the long-term illusion of a military decision.

"Vietnamization" thus means prolongation of the war, pitting Vietnamese against Vietnamese, continuNam and sabotage of the Paris Conference

INSOLUBLE CONTRA-DICTIONS

plan of the US is torn

tween the end and the means In order to maintain by nialist domination while a half-a-million-strong expedi-tionary force has proved impotent, the US reckons to trust that role to a puppet mercenary army in disintegration. The reinforcement of such an army implies the existence of a viable and efficacious puppet administration while the Thieu-Ky-Khiem clique can hardly stand on its own less even with funcist ive measures against the opposition. Then, contradiction be

tween the pressing need of inevitable slowness of Vietnamization plan The Nixon administration wishes to rapidly ease th pressure of popular protest against the war. The with drawal of troops in small doses does not work as US public opinion insists on the immediate repatriation of American servicemen. Satis-faction of such a demand would jeopardize US military position in the formation and equipping of new puppet units. But the weakness of the Saigon regime and the exiguity of the areas under its control do not allow a speedy performance. The announcement of withdraw als — even gradual and par-tial—of US troops is a hard blow dealt to the morale of the US and puppet soldiers and aggravates the divergencies in the enemy ranks, tion" more difficult.

THIN HOPES

THE Nixon administration boisterously advertizes the merits and success of its plan. US propaganda extols the raising combativeextois the raising comparison-ness of the pupper army and the strengthening of the Thieu-Ky-Khiem clique while trying to expose the weak-ness of the Liberation Arm-ed Forces of the PRG. The obduracy of the Nixon adwar of aggression is only matched by its craftiness to

However, all these hope are vanishing into thin air. Does Mr. Nixon wish in that way to reduce US combat casualties, limit US direct involvement and appease public opinion in the US? The battle-count in 1969— "Vietnamization" yearcan hardly confirm that in manpower and materials outstripped that of 1968, the

year held by Mr. Nixon as the most disastrous for the US forces in Viet Nam. Nothing shows that the trend can be reversed in the year which has just started. The time will come when the token troop reduction trick will be seen through unless it is stepped up to the great detriment of US position in South Vist Nam.

Does Mr. Nixon want to gain at all costs a "position of strength" at the Paris negotiations? The failure of US escalation in North Viet Nam and the staggering blows dealt by the Tel 1968 blows dealt by the Tet 1969 offensive clearly forced the US to the four-party con-ference on Viet Nam in Paris. While the deployment of huge forces and of all atrocious war means has not helped the US get a position of strength how can it tion of strength, how can it do so by substituting puppet troops for American Gis? The major trumpcard of this illusory "position of strength" is precisely the US Expeditionary Corps; without it, what "position of strength" can Mr. Nixon hone to attain?

The US President wants to snatch a military de-cision in the long run. But the outcome of the war cannot be decided by some change of circumstances. It depends on essential and permanent factors: the mo-rale and combativeness of the troops, strategy and tactics, the stability of the rear base... As time goes by, the criminal character of the war of aggression becomes more transparent, which radically undermines the fighting potential of the US troops, whose partial US troops, whose partial withdrawal embitters the differences in the ranks withdrawal embitters the differences in the ranks of the US and quislings. General Abrans' defensive strategy clashes with the character of the US war of aggression which should essentially be an offensive one. Far from backing the US troops in South Viet Nam, public opinion in the US has been pressing for their immediate repatriation. On the other hand, the righteousness of the Vietnamese cause mobilizes broader and broader sections of the Southern people for the struggle for independ-cape and freedom and wins struncher and stauncher international support. The Lib-eration armed forces are more and more combat-harden-ed through a long resistance ed through a long resistance war and capable of striking at their enemy even in his last refuge. With the forma-tion of the PRG, the free areas in the South have been consolidated; North Vict Nam, the great rear-base of the South, leaning on the socialist countries, keeping up successfully its socialist construction in to give more effec-

tive assistance to the libera-

tion in the South. Nothing

confirms Nixon's hope to see

the balance of forces tilting in favour of the

prolongation of the war.

fated "de-Americanization" of the war, Mr.
Nizon's "Victnamization"
is doomed to failure. The
only possible "de-Americanization" is the total unconditional withdrawal of all US troops from South Viet Nam. The only sensible "Vietnamization" is to let the Vietnamese people settle them-

THE ONLY WAY OUT selves, their own affairs

plied by the ten-point and PRG. Short of that, find the light at the end to is stubbornly progressing.

HUONG NAM

50th Plenary Session of Paris Conference on Viet Nam (Jan. 15, 1970)

### DRVN Envoy Calls for a US Realistic Approach to Viet Nam

legation, laid bare the Nixon administration's systematic and crafty manoeu vres in the past year, aimed at fooling public opinion, covering up its scheme to covering up its scheme to prolong the war and im-posing neo-colonialism on South Viet Nam, thus the progress of

President Nixon has been resident Nixon has been unceasingly protesting his "desire to end the Viet Nam war", he pointed out. But during the past year in office, he did not do anything to stop it but instead dragged it on and even intensified it.

Mr. Ha Van Lau then denounced US continued encroachments sovereignty, and threats to the security of the DRVN. In 1969, he said, US aircraft carried out 11,810 reconnaissance flights over reconnaissance lights over North Viet Nam. Against the zone lying between the 17th and 19th parallels, more than 600 bombard-ments by US tactical planes, were recorded together with
40 bombings by US B.52
strategic planes and nearly
300 shellings by US warships
off the coast or by US
artillery based South of the demilitarized zone.

In South Viet Nam, the US has been trying to put US has been trying to put 'maximum military pres-sure', carrying out the "accelerated pacification' program, stepping up bomb-ngs and toxic chemical sprayings. The US and puppets' raiding operations in 1969 doubled those in the previous year.

The DRVN envoy dismiss The DRVN envoy dismissed Nixon's "peace plan"
carried out by means of
"Vietnamization" of the
war as a plan for war prolongation. He again scored
Mr. Nixon's tricky troop
reduction by dribblets reduction by dribblets aiming at appeasing public opinion and emphasized opinion and emphasized that Nixon's "three cri-teria" for US troop with-drawal were impossible to

With regard to with regard to po-litical problems relat-ed to South Viet Nam, Mr. Ha Van Lau com-mented, the US President claims that the US respects

A T the soth session of the right to self-determina-tion of the South Vietnamese Ambassador Ha Van spephel and agrees to the Lau, speaking on behalf of the DRVN Government de in South Viet Nam. In fact, people and agrees to the holding of general elections in South Viet Nam. In fact, he is clinging to the puppet Thieu-Ky-Khiem administra-tion and insisting that the latter be put in charge, o organizing elections likely to be rigged, in the hope of legalizing this lackey adminintration The DRVN representative

refuted Nixon's contention that there would be "massacres" in South Viet Nam after US withdrawal. This, he said, in but a pretext to keep US troops in South Vict Nam and dodge discussions of a sensible political solution to the Vict Nam problem. To mislead world opinion which is condemning the US troops in South Vict Nam, the Nixon administration and the Nixon administration and its lackeys, on the one hand, falsely charged the PLAF with mass slaughters, and on the other hand, launched a campaign on the "prisoners of war" issue. Mr. Ha Van Lau exposed the and scheme to manoeuvre and scheme to prolong the war and clude the discussion of the key Nivon administration must therefore bear reponsibility for delaying the settlement of the problem concerning mi litarymen captured in the war, a problem which will war, a problem which will be solved within the framework of the overall solution

"On the anniversary of the year in office," he concluded proach to the Viet Nam prob-lem, for abandonment of their illusory hope for a military victory through Vietnamization and of Viet Nam, forcing neo-colo-nialism on South Viet Nam and perpetuating the partishould give up their manoru-vre of downgrading the con-ference to subsequently sabotage it, and engage serious negotiations to settle the Viet Nam problem on the basis of the to-point overall solution put forward by the South Viet Nam National Front for Liberation and the Provisional Revolutionary Gove

# EXPANSION OF LOCAL INDUSTRY IN NAM HA

NAM HA is a delta prov-ince in North Viet Nam with a population of more than 1.6 million. Its main trade is agricultural production. A few industrial establishments it had were heavily damaged during the war of resistance against the French, Following the return of peace in 1954, some of these installations were re-stored and expanded, chiefly to meet the immediate needs of the people in the towns and district centres.

In 1965 when the US escatatad its war into North Viet Nam, in implementation of the State policy, Nam Ha started expanding its local industry to serve as the motive force for the building a strong and steady local

Over the past few years Over the past few years, local industry in Nam Ha, relying on the materials found in the province itself and building on a scale com-patible with war-time conditions has been expanding quickly to all areas includ-ing the urban centres, the coastal plains the mountain ous areas and areas special-izing in industrial crops or rice growing. Along with

broadening the existing bases. broadening the existing bases, Nam Ha has built new ones. Only in the past four years, in spite of the harsh condi-tions of war, 18 old estab-lishments have been enlarglishments have been enlarged and 21 new ones built.
Many traditional handlorafts have also been restored and developed. Today, the whole local industry network in Nam, Ha can already boast of 58 Stafe-run enterprises and 255 small industry or handloraft to operatives with a contingent of 90,000 workers and torderssional or new forms and torders a ers and professional or non specialized craftsmen. This is a many-fold increase compared with the past.

of the Nam Ha local industry, which now comprises it branches. The main ones are mechanical engineering, building materials, textile industry and food-processing industry. Remarkable has been the vigorous develop-ment of the mechanical engineering whose network now is reaching down from the province level to the districts, villages and agricultural coops. It provides on-the-spot service to meet a the specific needs of each farming area tories specialized in the production of agricultural machines, and others specialized in the manufacture of farm tools for areas with two rice crops, those with one rice crop (low-lying areas) and those with industrial crops.

Growth rate has been high

in both sectors: the State owned sector and the sector owner actor and the sector of a constraint industry. Gross output value has also output value has also been rising rapidly. In the four years of the US war of destruction, the output value of means of production grew ry. 8. % and flat of consumer goods, 19.9%. The increment was 'respectively 45.4% and 11.3% for the State-owned industry and handleraft co-ops. The tempo of development has the principal branches: 65.7% for mechanical engineering, 28.3% for the settle industry. The output value of regional industry in 1968 want, up by 19.3% small industry in 1968 went up by 19.3% compared with the pre-war period and accounted for

while retaining the character about 30% of the total indus-as specialized establishments.

For instance, there are factechnique and management. the output value of the in 1000 increased by 15,60 1968. The rate of 16.8% for mechanical engi neering, timber processing, paper making, pottery, glassware and food processing. In particular, cont production has soared up eight-foldcompared with 1968.

The list of industrial products put out by Nam Ha year. Many items have achiev ed ever higher quality like agricultural machines and spare parts to equip the mechanical installations in agricultural co-ops, the water agricultural co-ops, the water pump of the 500 — 1000 cubic metres per hour capacity, the rice-threshing machine of the 4 tons per hour capacity, the animal food grinder, the steel-hulked motor launch, highgrade textile... Prepara-tions are under way for the construction of car bodies and small passenger boats.

Local industry in Nam Ha has been focusing efforts on meeting the increasing needs of agricultural produc tion. The output of indus-trial goods to be supplied to agriculture has been to agriculture has been continually on the upgrade. In 1968, it went up three times compared with the pre-war period.

Every year the province's industrial concerns supply local agriculture with more than 500 agricultural ma-chines of various kinds, and tens of thousands of farm implements of the tradi tional or improved types. To date, 81% of the agricultural co-ops in the province have been equipped each with a mechanical installation and 56% of them with workshops to repair farm tools. On an average, each 3.3 hand tools in took (as against 2,2 in 1965). Thanks to this, in been com-pleted a dozen days carlier formerly. Especially, the farmers have saved hundreds of thousands workdays for such jobs irrigation, crop tending, ploughing and harrowing for the purpose of intensive cultivation to raise crop vield. As a result, the rice output has upped markedly. In 1968, in spite of many difficulties arising out of war aftermaths and weather war attermaths and weather vagaries, some districts reaped 5 tons or more of paddy per hectare for the whole year. In the current winter-spring 1969 cultivation campaign, the acreage under industrial crops is 5% larger, that of rice 1,000 res and the rice output 1.1% higher (per hectare yield

went up by 1.7% over the went up by 1.7% over the previous winter-spring crop). The output of spring rice rose to 2.7 tons per hectare in a single crop. Porato productivity doubled and the number of bogs grew by 7.2% compared with the corresponding in 1968. It is safe to say that thanks to the growth of local industry agricultural production in Nam Ha is developing in a more and more comprehensive manner along the line of high farming. There is every each the three targets se for agriculture throughout North Viet Nam one man work, five tons of paddy in a year, and two hogs for each hectare of cultivated

A part from giving effec tive assistance to agriculture, the local industry of Nam Ha has also been helpful in the restoration and devel opment of transport communications. Each it has repaired or built thousands of tons of transport means, ten times as much as in 1964. For heavyfreight water transport, it has produced steel-hulked launches and boats, ro-ton wooden boats, etc. It has also supplied thousands of hand-carts to the agricul-tural co-ops and work tools for the building of thousands kilometres of countr from the fields to the co-or storehouse, from the village to districts and from dis tricts to the province capital

There has also been a continual increase of consumer goods with accounted for about 600, of the retail sales in the organized market of the province in 1968. The same year saw a rise o four million metres of white cloth, five million metres of coloured cloth, twenty thousand tons of salt and bean sauce over 1007. The total output value of consumer goods went up by 1.5 times compared with the pre war

Remarkably enough, there has been a broad partici-pation of the population in the industrial build-up in the province. Take Nam Ninh district for example. Of the 40 villages in the district, 30 villages already have their own industrial installations. The industrial output value in the district in 1968 made up 47% of the combined output of industry

At present, Nam Ha's industry is boosting its activity in a more comprchensive manner, in im-plementation of the "on-the-spot logistics" guideline in order to meet in an ever fuller measure the needs of production, the fighting and the life of the local popu-



Repairing and overhauling pumps at Xuan Phung co-operative, Nam Ninh district, Nam Ha province

On Dec. 10, 1969, at a press conference called by the International Information Center to Denounce Was Crimes and the Franco - Victnamore Medical Association in Paris, James Weeks who once served as a medic with I'S temps in Faet Nam, gar- his testimony. on the last Nam war and atrocates. His report

N March 1997, I arrived in pression that I was liberating South Viet Nam from commonism I started to have second thoughts soon after landing and getting shot at in Saizon and seeing looks of hate and fear on every aide from the people I was supposed to be liberating. I was then assigned to the First Intantry Devision attached to the 4th Cavaire. where I spent the next or months as a medic for First Company and Brayo Company Our base camp was in Plut Lor but most of the time I worked out of Quang Lo I arrived in Onang Lin in April At that time it wita village of about three to he's hassling with you. foor handred people, small

last seroes from the vil. week after week, month aflage was a rubber plantation with a small airstrip. We canned on a full overlooking the plantation manager's home, complete with swim ming pool, etc.

We stayed or this area working out of thing Lor and An Loc. on " search and destroy" incisions not tinching much except an occasional mine, deserted camp sites and an occasional round of sumer free But we always had the feeling that the enemy was all around us observing us. The platoon consisted of two or three tanks, five to seven tracked APCs (armored personnel carriers), from four to live men per APC. After a month without any contact with the real enemy, we moved on up to the Black Virgin Mountain, to take part in Operation Junction City. That was in what was known as "free-fire zone" area. It was explained to us at that point that anything alive was supposed to be dead. We were told that if we saw a "gook" or thought we saw one, no matter how big or

need for permission to lire. It was just an open turkey shoot, man, woman of child.

At that time, men, women and children were all part of the "body count". No preference made at all. all went into the "body count". This went on for a few weeks. At this point I started to realise that a large percentage of guys, from top to bottom, had a great deal of paranoia.

It seemed that everyone was trying to kill you. There were no friendly torces. The people themselves were after us, the farmer in the field, the girl at a stream. They were all classified as "gooks". In fact they were all 'gooks". Whether it was a girl working in the PK, they were all "gooks". All something less than buman beings. This is a thing I want to emphasize. The effect this has on a soldier is great because it Il you can kill a water butfalo or a monkey, you can kill a "gook". You can kill your own serveaut too if Another thing important

to realise is when every day,

ler month, you hear the

bombs, a thousand tons a day dropping, the artillery tiring all night, you know pulverised completely. the bombs are landing in some place and they're not saying "you're a woman, you're a child". They're just polecrising everything out of sight. I started to realise what's the war about when I asked a guy after the first time he'd killed someone over there how he telt. He said: "It's about god damn time. I thought those candy assed flyers wouldn't leave anything for me". He was angry that it had taken him a Other GIs who feel like I month to get a chance to

let out his hostility. After leaving that area we came back at Quang Lui, I noticed a small village across the street from the rubber plantation was being built up into a city, wall to wall, hars where you could buy US cigarettes, beer, food, sex - if you had the right price. At first you wonder how they get the t'S cigarettes, beer, etc.,

then you notice there's no

more in the PX's which

small, we shoot first. No are empty, so you pay twice

the price in the village. You know that some PX sergeant is getting rich. This builds un your hate even more for the Vietnamese people. So what happens is you walk into a har sometimes and blow the head off the har-tender and take your cigarettes and walk out. This is what happened in Phu Loi. Along with occasional night raids into the hars to rape the girls pressure had been building up like that for two and a half months, when we left there. The day after we left, work word that Charlie Company which had replaced us in the 4th Cav. were overrun the night we left and almost completely wiped out. The word we got, when we got back from the two who were left, as the ARVN troops stationed on their flank fired on them at the same time as the fire from the jungle, also from the village and from inside the airstrip. Nobody knew where it was coming from - except that it was from all over. We began to realise then what was people's war. Everyone was against us as we had felt from the beginning. When we got back Quang Loi had been levelled, first by artillery from An Loc; second gunships. You would never have known there had been a village there. It had been

Nixon save there was a massacre, an isolated incident at Son My of a few soldiers who went berserk. But I hope that the message the people get from my experiences is that Son My is not an isolated atrocity. The war in Viet Nam is an atrocity. What seems to be an atrocity to some people is everyday life, and standard operating proredure out there.

do, but who could not come here, have asked me to relate some of their experiences. Some of them have written them down, in signed statements.

I have noted some extracts from their full statements. For instance, that of ex-Specialist 4th class Curtis Kirker, 3rd Brigade of the Fourth Infantry Division, who served as an infantry rifleman and combat correspondent from April 1, 1067 to April 4. 1068. " The My Lai massacre, "he says, " is an extension of such attitudes and enough for another ambush. policies as I saw developing in Quang Ngai province Although the majority of the killings in Viet Nam don't occur in the same attention - getting fashion as at My Lai, it is just as cold-blooded and cruel, just

as disgusting, just as shocking. "Shortly after I arrived in Viet Nam, a sergeant offered to show me a collection of human ears. The man even offered me a set. Shortly before I left, one of the machinegunners in a platoon of Alpha Company removed the finger of an unarmed now dead Vietnamese in order to get the ring.

"When I asked him why he was so pleased, he simply said, the zo dollars he could get from the ring, would buy plenty of heer. The time between was filled with incidents like these and all of them are examples of an attitude that makes massacres possible." Sergeant Kirker goes on

to speak about the sort of

ambushes he used to take part in, in Quang Ngai province where the My Lai massacre took place: "Villages as well as trails leading to them were often mined .. It was during this period the company under Capt. Ellerson had a kill count of around fifty, I think the exact number war 48 of these - a total of three carried weapons. One carried rifle. The other two had knives... Of the 50 approximately 30, some were women, the rest are between the ages of eight and sixteen ... Once in ambush position most knew they would be shooting unarmed civilians. Most felt they were getting back at the Vietnamese and were pleased to see the body count stack up like that. At the beginning of the operation. Captain Ellerson made a statement to the company which he repeated throughout the operation; I want those bodies stacked like cord wood'. He meant It literally. The bodies were stacked four one way, four the other. My unit was not the only one carrying out ambushing tactics and by the end of the month, the area was considered unusable. The

ambush sites made these

men too sick to stay long "While patrolling in the

mountains to the west of Duc Pho, the second platoon came across a woman carrying two babies. No attempt was made to stop her by torce which would have been easy since she had one child on her back and carried the other in her arms. The point man fired first and then most of the lead squad moved up into firing position and fired. One child and the mother were killed, the other child was later sent to the orphanage at Duc Pho. This went on all the time."

I have another statement from Specialist 4th class William Whimeyer, who was a tank crewman, driver and gupper in the 173rd Airhorne Brigade: " I witnessed the shooting of 12 civilians, all women or men over 60 years of age. We were sweeping a large rice paddy, near An Hoi village. There was no enemy fire, just people

"When you're in a tank, the people you're shooting at aren't real people, they're dots in your sight - they're just 'gooks'. To the GI mind the 'gooks' are running, they're VC.

" Later the men dismounted from the tanks and counted the bodies. They got a lot of laughs out of that ...

There's Roger Williams a former correspondent who covered part of the war for papers like the Denver Post, Cleveland Plain Dealer. Boston Globe and Ramparts He made a special trip from November 1968 to January 1969, checking up on " pacification" and so on. He also gave me a written statement, a few extracts of which I'd like to read .

"I watched an armored company with air support destroy a small village near the Cambodian border. I was in the colonel's command chopper. He ordered it destroyed. He watched it burn. I asked him about it, 'Don't worry,' he said. 'It's only a gook village.' I watched small hamlets totally disappear in the period... No officer or civilian aid - worker in the vicinity anything about. knew After there was nothing smell of bodies in the good

(Continued page 7)

### ANTI-WAR UNITED FRONT SHAPING UP IN SOUTH VIET NAM CITIES

1969 saw Nixon step up the implementation of his plan for "Vietnamization" of the war. To this end, the Saigon puppet regime ruthleasly cracked down on the popular mov-ement in all cities and areas still under its control, sped up troop impressment and increased taxes, coupled with demagogic gimmicks. But all this effort only met with strong opposition from people from all walks of life.

"UNPOPULAR" MEASURES

THE war of aggression more and THE war of aggression more and more impoverished the population, particularly the workers and other labouring people. As a result, there existed constant unrest in virtually all enterprises, bailding sites and other economic establishments with workers pres-sing for wage lifts, reduction of prices and betterment of living conditions. Labour disturbances in strategically important sectors strategically important actions affected US-pupper military logistical plans, such as the strike of workers at Saigon's commercial port (January and April 1969) and that of 3,000 employees of Air Viet Nam (December 1969). The workers are action of 3,000 railway action of 3,000 railway. persistent action of 1,000 railway workers, that of 30,000 transport workers in the whole of South Viet Nam against the introduction of three-wheeled Lambretta vans workers against the closing down of the municipal bus service which threw them out into the streets, the last being also of a long-term and persistent basis and receiving the support of many branches of activity and many localities, led o the general strike called by 118 trade unions in Saigon on Jan. 7 and 8, 1970 which paralysed many k y branches of activity in the city.

At the end of October 1969 when the Saigon puppet administration decided to hike taxes on many items of imported goods, a move which ent prices rocketing and made life harder, popular feeling ran higher in virtually all South Vietnamese cities and inspired vigorous driver for the cancellation of the decision whose impopularity was acknow-ledged by Thieu himself. This large-scale protest drew in many members of the puppet army and administration and even prompted the puppet Senate and House of Representa-tives to speak out against this economic measure on many occasions.

The struggle for the right to live had always been associated with that for democratic rights. The "10-68" anti-strike law enacted by the Saigon puppet administration came under fire from all working quarters. In spite of terror and repression, strikes erupted in many places throughout the year. Apart from the abovementioned walkouts, workstoppages occurred at the Sicovina textile mill, the BGI soft drink firm, the Khanh Hoi sugar mill, Grall Hospital, Qui Nhon, Da Nang and Can Tho ports, etc... Besides the claim for vital rights, the workers put forward slogans against harsh regulations destined to stifle their political life.

The intensity of the movement can be measured by the number of strikes: 8 in Jan. 1969, 30 in June 1969 and 60 in November 1969.

Writers, artists, journalists, small traders, small proprietors and others also militated for freedom of speech and trade and improvement of living

WHEN THE WHITE HOUSE PLANS TO "CHANGE THE COLOUR OF THE CORPSES'

WORKERS and other labouring people in various cities, in their effort for vital and democratic rights, did not fail to oppose "general mobilisation" and the organisation of "civil defence" and to demand a sud to the war, restorato demand an end to the war, restoration of peace, the change of the régime and the removal of reaction-ary rulers. These objectives also won the support of various strata of the people, especially the youths

hard resistance of 30,000 students from 16 Saigon University faculties against military training during the 1000 summer vacation had a far reaching impact on many other universities and colleges in South Viet Nam and attracted a large number of students. People in almost all cities fought relentlessly against the collection of cannon-fodder for the US aggressors. Young people either dodged or openly resisted the draft. Families did everything they could to get deferment for their sons and hasbands. Many military conscripts and many persons forced to join "popular defence" teams deserted or disobeyed orders. These objectors acted in clearer and clearer con-sciousness of the tragic consequence of the prolongation of the US war of aggression. In a letter dated Dec. 12 and addressed to American students. the Saigon General Association of Students called for total US troop pull-out, for sovereignty and demo racy to be restored to the country and declared. " We hate the war and we do not want our people to be sake of any inhuman policeman. We do object to anyone wanting to teach us how to kill people". This state-ment threw light on the attitude of the Vietnamese towards the policy 'Vietnamization" of the

and students. The long, resolute and

bluntly termed a "change of the colour of the corpses". THE PATH TO LIFE

towards what US Ambassador Bunker

THERE was an increasing realisation by the city folk of the origin of their spiritual and material agonies. "Those who style themselves as nationalists and who themselves as national are lending a are feeding on the war are lending the hand to foreigners to prolong the killing and the neo-colonialist rule over the Vietnamese people", stated the Venerable Thien Hoa, head of the Hoa Dao Buddhist Institute in Saigon, at a Buddhist Congress in late November-early December 1969. In early Spring 1969, Buddhist

circles launched a movement to end the war, restore peace and condense by the US-puppets with a night of praying for peace at An Quang Pagoda, It was followed by a more than 10,000-strong street demonstra tion on Jan 23 and a protest sit-in in volving 200 intellectuals, students and political figures. Most recently, on Dec 15, 1060 at another teach-in at Ar Quang Pagoda participated in by many representatives of the urban people, a committee of action for peace was set up to mobilize the cople for the vital drive for peace and independence

A remarkable occurrence had been unfolding since May 1969 when the townsfolk and many members of the puppet administration and officerpupper administration and officers and men of the pupper army began heated discussions of the re-point overall solution advanced by the NFL the formation of the RSVN Provisional Revolutionary Government and its 12-point programme of action. Thousands of teach-ins were held in many cities to debate a correct solution to the Viet Nam prob lem. The audience condemned the Thieu-Ky-Khiem triumvirate for obstructing the peace move and demanded their replacement by a government representative of the aspirations of various segments of the people and canable of winning back peace and the country's sovereignty Such will had an impact on politi cal circles in the puppet National Assembly, Many congressmen raised their voices for partial or total dissolution of the US installed Cabinet, an end to arbitrary economic measures, etc...

The paying of last tributes to President Ho Chi Minh in diversified forms in various South Viet Nam cities also had a great political significance and impact.

A united front against the US war has been in the making in South Viet Nam cities and striking hard at the Nixon administration's scheme to "Vietnamise" the war.

# "CLEAR-AND-HOLD": AN IMPOTENT STRATEGY

Condensed from a Commentary by Quan Doi Nhan Dan (People's Irmy)

"HE "clear-and-hold" strategy which Creighton Abrams has been carrying out in South Viet Nam since the outbreak of the general offensive and widespread uprising of the Liberation Armed Forces in early 1968 is sharing the fate of the US two-prong strategy ("search-and-destroy" and "pacification").

Its basic objective is to "hold" To "clear" is also aimed at "hol-

to hold the US losses at a — to note the US losses at a nevel acceptable to the US and enables it to prolong the war, find a solution from a "position of strength" and cope with the protest movement in the United States.

- to held the puppet army and administration from the danger of complete disintegration:

- to hold the nerve positions, namely the towns, military bases, main communication arteries and populated rural regions

To attain these objectives, the US has decided on the following - to build an efficacious defence

system around the towns and impor-tant bases, strengthen the defence of military sectors and sub-sectors and set up strongholds along stra-tegic roads;

- to establish defence shields for pushing the war away from the towns of military and political im-

to launch police operations in various towns, clearing operations around towns and bases and along communication axes, counter-opera-tions against the offensives of the

PLAF, increase reconnaissance and commando activities to locate the

latter for air and artillery strikes : - to carry out the "pacification" plan so as to regain the control of conulated rural areas.

Has the US Succeeded in Pushing the War away from the Towns?

The Figure said on February 25, 1969, "All military and police operations, all artiflery barrages and B.52 raids cannot check the

As a matter of fact, in the so days ending March 4, 1969, more than towns and urban centres and many other military bases were targets o PLAF infantry and artillery attacks. so were 485 positions in at least 94 towns and urban centres in mid-May Many other actions were mounted

from August to the end of last year on various towns, urban centres and military sub-sectors throughout South Viet Nam.

Have US Losses Been Reduced?

Renter on February 26, 1969, reported, "American daily losses in the first four days of the new Vict Cong offensive are heavier than those for the first four days of the nation-wide Tet offensive last year.

According to a recent communique of the Command of the South Vie Nam People's Liberation Armed Forces, the latter in 1969 put out of action 235,000 US and satellite as against 230,000 in the

Have the US Succeeded in Pre-

Abrams himself dared not answer

(Continued page 7)

eignty and security of the DRVN, stepping up their was of aggression in South Viet Nam, provoking, and con-

ducting sabotage against, Cambodia, intensifying and stepping up their special war in Laos to a dangerous level

and maintaining a tense situation in Indochina and Southeast Asia.

Facing the US imperialists

manocuvres, he continued, the Indochinese peoples are determined to strengthen

their solidarity, resist and

defeat US aggression and preserve their sacred national

firmly support the legitimate

ple, the correct position of the Luctian Patriotic Front

which strives for a settle

ment of the Laotian prob-

1662 Geneva Agreement on Laos and in conformity with

ment of the Laotian Patriot

ic Front's Information Bu-

the upward trend of the Laotian revolution and is a fine expression of the friend-

ship and mutual encourage

ment between the two Fronts and peoples. We are convinced that the militant

solidarity between Viet Nam and Laos will develop ever more fruitfully, Tran Hun

The Vietnamese

# LAOTIAN PATRIOTIC FRONT'S Hanoi Information Bureau Inaugurated

implementation of an agreement between the Viet Nam Fatherland Front and the Laotian Pa-triotic Front, the Informa-tion Bureau of the Laotian Patriotic Front in Hanoi beside the Viet Nam Fatherland Front was officially inaugurated on January to, 1070.

In his speech delivered on this occasion, Phan Phim-phachanh, member of the Central Committee of the LPF and Director of the ation Bureau, pointed out that the setting up of the LPF Information Bureau in Hanoi was a new manifesta tion of the increasing militant solidarity between the Laotian and Vietnamese peoples and a great encour-agement to the Laotian people in the struggle against the US imperialists and their benchmen. He told the guest of the great successes recorded by the Laotian people over the past 15 years under the clearsighted leadership of the LIT headed by

He expressed deep grati-tude to the peoples of the socialist and nationalist countries and the progressive people the world over for their warm and active support to the Laotian people's

After condemning the US moerialists and their ac-

Prince Souphanouvong

complices — the Vientiane reactionary ruling circles and Prince Souvanna Phouma, for committing countless crimes in Laos and scheming to turn Laos into a new-type colony and military base, Phau Phimphachanh rejected the alanders levelled y the Laotian reactio

He said: " Peace will be restored in Laon if the US imperialists put an end to their interference and aggression in every form, implement the 1962 Geneva Agreement on Laos, respect ment the the sovereignty independence neutrality and territorial the Laotians settle their the Liadians settle their migratal affairs under the terms of the 1962-Geneva Agreement and with due consideration for the real situation in Laos, without US interference. First and foremost, the US must halt the Ladian liberated zones."

Speaking next, Tran Huu Duvet Secretary-General of the Viet Nam Fatherland Front Central Committee, paid tribute to the achievenents of the Laotian revo

Despite heavy losses, he said, the US aggressors remain very stubborn and perfidious. They continue encroaching upon the sover-

#### THE LAO SUNG ARE RESOLVED TO PUNISH THE ENEMY

A T a recent reception given by Phay Dang, Vice President of the CC of the Laotian Patriotic Front, and well-known chief of the Lao Sung, on December 15, 1969 on the occasion of the New Year of that nationality, Prince Souphanouvong called on all the patriotic armed forces and Laotian people, especially the Lao Sung, to step up their attachs against enemy encroaching operations of the patriotic armed forces and Laotian people, especially the Lao Sung, to step up their attachs against enemy encroaching operations.

on behalf of the CC of the LPF, Prince Souphanouvong congratulated the Lao Sung people on their contribution to the patriotic struggle against US aggression and called on them to punish the enemy for the crimes he had per-

periate in the raids now going on in the orines in an periate in the raids now going on in the Plain of Jars[In the name of the Lao Sung people, Play Dang indignantly denounced the US imperialists and their lackeys "divide and rule" policy and presaganging of Lao Song youth in the "special lorces" as cannon fodder in the song pounds in the "special lorces" as cannon fodder in the song youth or the "special lorces" as cannon fodder in the song youth in the "special lorces" as cannon fodder in the song you will be supported to the song youth or the song you will be supported to the supported to the song you will be supported to the supported to war of aggression

#### LAOTIAN PATRIOTS' EXPLOITS IN DECEMBER 1969

N December 1969, the second month of the dry-season counter-offensive of the Lactian patriotic armed forces, the enemy lost 2,400 troops, 44 military vehicles and hundreds of tons of other war means, announced KPL

Agency quoting incomplete reports.

This was biggest monthly loss in lives and war means This was higgest monthly loss in lives and war means for the US reactionaries in Laos last year. In the Plain of Jare — Xieng Khuang region, the main battlefield, the patriots put out of action 1,319 enemy troops. They saized or destroyed to artillery pieces, wrecked 35 military vehicles, mostly tanks and armoured cars, and 290 tents, and burned tens of thousands of litres of petrol. In Lower Laos, the patriots pushed up their attacks on Roads 9 and 13, while encircling enemy garrisons in Pakhong, Attopeu, Saravane. As a result, 620 adverse soldiers were knocked out, 45 weapons seized, and 3 military vehicles captured or destroyed by the patriots.

Stepping up the hunt for US-fostered bandits smuggled in the tree one in Upper Laos for sabotage activity, the

in the free zone in Upper Laos for sabotage activity, the patriotic armed forces duly punished the enemy in Tongkho area, Luang Prahang province, and forced over 100 bandits

Meanwhile, guerillas stepped up their actions everywhere behind enemy lines. In Vientiane, from December 1 to 20, they ambushed the enemy 6 times on the Vientiane — Nam Ngeum road, destroying 6 military vehicles and wiping out many enemy troops. The regional armed forces in many enemy troops. The regional armed forces in Borikhausay overran on December it an enemy position in Don village, killing 32 enemy, capturing or forced 5 others

### Chopper of US Airborne Division No 101 downed by guerrillas of Thun Thien province "CLEAR-AND-HOLD"...

(Continued from bare s)

in the affirmative. Despite the strict application of his tactics of maximum use of fire-power, the PLAF last year increased considerably their offensives. The greater US-puppet losses in man-power and materials, espec-ially in alreraft, vehicles cannons and vessels, proved that they grew proportion-ally to the fire-power em-ployed. At times the ineffi-"clearing" operations, but from their bases, the heavier their casualties, as proved by the A Bia battle

#### Have the Populated Rural Areas Reen "Pacified"

Of late while the US Of late, while the US claimed to control 90 per cent of the population, a high-ranking American officer told an American journalist then inquiring into "pacifithen inquiring into "pacifi-cation" progress in Quang Nam that 90 per cent of the local inhabitants would kill GIs at the least opportu-nity. The US and puppers have themselves acknowledged that "pacification" re-mains a hard job, that the "insecure" hamlets and villages are quite numerous and that tens of thousands of "pacification" agents have been wiped out.

#### Have the US Succeeded Belstering the Puppet Army's Morale?

According to *UPI* on September 28, 1969, the Saigon puppets' chieftain Nguyen Van Thies said that "he did not believe the Vietnamese army (puppet-Ed.) could defend the country properly if the US withdrew completely by 1970, leaving behind air force units, artil-lery and logistic support". Thieu did not tell the whole truth because the fact is that even now, with presence of more than 9 US infantry divisions in South Viet Nam, neither American nor puppet troops are able to cope with the PLAF attacks. As for the puppet army, it has taken serious thrashings in Chu Pa (Gia Lal), Ben Het, Bu Prang

(Quang Duc), Ba Ria, Long Khanh on the Xang Keo Ro canal in the Mekong Delta, etc. And what is remarkable, their losses have been their losses have been greater at the very places chosen as the key points of the "pacification" plan such as the High Plateaux, Western Nam Bo, Ben Tre and Rach Gia provinces. On the other hand, as reported AP on December desertions from the South Viet Nam (puppet-Ed.) armed forces increased this fall despite efforts to solve what officials say is the second most serious problem in Vietnamizing the war... With more than one million men Nam forces, the rate of to men adds up to a loss of 10,000 men a month."

strategy is going bankrupt.

Nixon and company are
trying by hook or by crook
to turn the tables, but how can this be possible when they are pinning their hopes on a strategy full of unsolva-ble contradictions?

"Our military can ceast

all offensive actions, all

search-and-destroy missions,

"The South Victoamese armed forces (number army-Ed.) will never successfully take over the military burden now carried by the United States.

" It is not hardware or training that is lacking in Saigon's armies. It is will, the one ingredient the United States will never be able to provide. Thieu's soldiers have no heart for this struggle and have not had any for Years. Indeed, one of the most striking phenomena of the war is the contrast between the contending forces : a Vietnamese dressed in the peasant garb of the NLF is one of the world's most formidable fighting men; the same man in the uniform of Saigon is one of the world's poorest. Why? Because one believes he fights to drive the foreigner from his soil while the other fights

only to sustain the power of

a corrupt military clique Under these - circumstances any hope of simultaneously defeating the NLF and withdrawing US troops has no chance of success.

" If, therefore, a continu ing US military presence in Viet Nam will not result in any genuine pacification of a war-weary and embittered countryside and will not make palatable a government that is not palatable, not an army fight that has no will to fight, it becomes useless to pursue further a course that is leading no where. It is useless to stay on even for the purpose of a bargaining position in Paris, because there is no reason to think that time will serve to strengthen the US position. The only viable option left for the US in Viet Nam is to withdraw at once from the whole tragically misconceived adventure

all air and sea attacks, and withdraw US troops to port areas for repatriation. This action would have the paramount advantage of returning the future of Viet Nam to the Vietnamese, where it belongs. Questions of reunification and political settle ment are questions for the Vietnamese to answer, because the Vietnamese, whether they live in Hanoi or in Saigon, are still a single people. As the only foreigners in South Viet Nam, the US and its allies have nothing to negotiate but the rate and manner of their withdrawal.

The statement concluded: "Let us therefore order a cease-fire and withdrawal from Viet Nam, unilaterally and immediately. If it was wrong to get in, it cannot be

### Military **Operations**

(Continued from page N)

on Jan. 4 and 5 130 casual action ties on the enemy, grounded 6 choppers and cantured 20 members of a " pacification '

On the same day, in Saigon, they blew up a US military car, killing all passengers on board.

On the Western bank of the Mekong, about 50 km Southwest of Saigon, regional troops of My The province from January 3 to 5 rushed a battalion camp, pounded 5 subsector CPs and intercented the enemy operating in the region 100 and a cannons put out of

Further West between the arms of the Molecus and the Gulf of Thailand, the PLAI were most active in Chau Des province chiefly in the Seven-Mountains area. They also flattened Rong Co post (Ian.4) and Ba Dei post (lan s) sank or burnt vessels on the Viels Te canal dug along the Cambodian border Eurthermore JED reported on Ian is that the special forces" camp at Be Xeei had been completely blatted out by a daytim attack on Jan. 14 and that two American advisors were adverse soldiers 9 vehicles among the 18 men killed during that PLAF action.

# Son My...

(Continued from page 4)

left but shattered houses and blown-up gardens, the hamlet was 'pacified'. If peo-ple inadvertently stay in such hamlets on a day of incoming fire - they die. private bunkers, they are killed by US troops who are told that anyone in a bunker is Viet Cong ...

"One colonel I overheard when he was presented with his brigade's body count for the day - 59 enemy killed - and told that the 3rd brigade only got 40, said: 'I don't care which brigade got most -all I care is that I'm killing gooks'. This is not GI policy, it is the policy of our officers. .

In one of Williams' inter riews with a senior US aid official, be was told that 3,000 bodies had been killed US air strikes in the Cho Lon area after the Tet offensive. When he what happened to them, he was told that aid had order ed that they should be buil-When the GIs found several thousand bodies buried in the race track near Saigon it was announced by our embassy as a "Viet Cong massacre", Roger Williams discovered, "But it was found from prisoner interrogation that these too were victims of American bombing during the reconquest of Saigon and that the NFL torces had buried them by hand, in carefully dog

Roger Williams touches on a point that all of us out there feel and which I myself have mentioned :

"Our planes, our artillery. our gunships get five hundred a day, so what if my

when we've taken fire from What most amazed me is that we would completely destroy the country in order to save' it, if we deemed it necessary. We have already done half the job. Our policy and our giant machine bases its existence on a systematic program of destruction with artillery. bomber naval guns, gunships rockets, mortars, tanks and fifty-calibre machineguns mounted on armored vehicles... We are trying to destroy the Vietnamese revolution, and with it Viet Nam. In a way we are succeeding.

platoon shoots on a village

" One major told me he personally counted 2,000 bodies after a particularly exhausting engagement. They were bulldozed into heaps and shovelled into sling-nets and taken away by Chinook choppers. 'When you see a sight like that', he said smiling, 'you know we're winning...'"

The main point that I rould like to make is that and all my friends who have been out there object to the idea that Son My was an isolated case. It is stan dard operating procedure.

> TO THE READER H'e are aware that there

is much room for improvenent in the wording of our paper. We apologize for this shortcoming and highly appreciate all your suggestions as they will help us to serve you more officiently in future.

# ANTI-WAR AMERICANS ISSUE STATEMENT

THE American Friends Service Committee has issued a statement baring the Nixon administra-tion's tricks to further their scheme of war continuation in Viet Nam.

The statement, entitled "Viet Nam - Political Illusions and Moral Realities"

" It has been more than a year since the rhetoric of peace began in Viet Nam. During this time scores of thousands of men and wom-en and children have died in the fighting. They continue to die today, and every evidence in Viet Nam is that they will continue to die tomorrow unless there is an unparalleled demand from the American people that the slaughter be halted. While attempting to disarm public opinion with troop withdrawals, the Nixon administration continues to press the war.

government leaders continue to foster illusions in regard to Viet Nam. Americans are under the impression that the war is all but over; it is not. They are being told that the US military policy interest of progress in Paris; it is not. They are encouraged to think that the Thieu-Ky government is becoming more acceptable to the Vietnamese and more competent to carry on the war with diminishing US help; it is

The statement went on: "If the cruelty of a war is measured by the ratio of civilian to military casual-

may be the cruelest of modern times. Even before the Tet offensive of 1968, it was estimated that there "The US military and were from 150,000 to 200,000 civilian casualties annually....

Handreds of thousands of acres have been defoliated, countless villages have been razed, and bomb craters pockmark the countryside.

11-52 raids alone have
torn 2 million and a
half of holes 45 feet in
diameter and 30 feet deep—
holes that are now filled with stagnant water and serve as breeding grounds for malarial mosquitoes and other insects. More tons of explosives have been dropped were dropped on all the Axis powers in all of the Second World War...

US goals in Viet Nam are limited ones. Earlier talk of victory has ceased as the death toll has risen and as the decimation of Viet Nam has become apparent. Today the apologists for continued military action argu that our commitment will be fulfilled if our forces can achieve a reasonably pacific countryside, a reasonably stable government, and a reasonably effective Vietnamese army, capable of de-fending itself against its opponents. The American ople are assured that progress toward these goals is being made.

'In fact, pacification efforts have repeatedly fail-ed over a ten-year period, and they will continue to fail. The countryside is less feeling has never been so intense as it is now. The Thieu-Ky government does not offer any promise of future stability. The government in Saigon is a military dictatorship propped up by US power, despised by most Vietnamese, and notoriously corrupt. Freedom of speech is suppressed. No one knows exactly how many Vietnam-ese political prisoners lan-guish in Viet Nam's prison, ut the figure is certainly in the thousands, and includes many of the country's lead ing intellectuals; university professors, religious leaders. lawyers, students, newspaper editors, politicians - anyone who has dared to advocate olitical initiatives to end

VIET NAM COURIER

Cam Toi Vielozy

### THE FIRST STAGGERING BLOW OF THE YEAR AT THE US **AGGRESSORS**

N their defence system in the Da Nang Chu Lai sector, the Americans have set up an important base on the formerly woody hill-top of Cam Zoi, about forty kilometres south of Da Nang, near the Son, Called "Base Ross" by the US command, it always served as regimental field CP whenever an important operation took place in that area and was therefore constantly improved and strengthened chiefly since the enemy had been driven unto a general defensive position all over South Viet Nam. The great success quickly won by the PLAF on the meht of lan. s at Cam Zon bears a great significance at the beginning of the new year.

Figst the heavy losses suftered by the enemy cloquently testify to the deadly punch of the PLAF, who in a record time killed or wounded nearly 400 Gln, wiped out a battalion CP, a infantry companies and an artillery platoon and destroyed a radar station, the signal centre, o military vehicles, 2 long-range camons, about one hundred barracks, caseand blockhouses, mates burnt, blew up or seized a ing quantity of war materials, ammunition and fuel.

Furthermore, the factor surprise had nothing to do here though the Gla were well taken unawares in their sleep, for it was not the first time that that base was overrun by the PLAF. In the winter of 1967, the first GIs (paratroops of the US torst Division) already suffered a great disaster at Cam Zoi Chu Hely so and 27 tufo, the touth Light Brigade which relieved the American "para" was clobbered on that hill-top. In the automn of that year, that brigade was bombardments that it had to be replaced by the First Marine Division, which in its turn licked the dust in a fierce hand-to-hand fight on the night of Jan. 6, 1970.

Besides, the Yankees were well prepared to parry our blows, as shown by the war materials captured at Cam Zoi, which included many electronic apparatuses apparently meant to dectect attackers at night.

The successful coup also illustrates the patriotic forces' capability of dealing with all defences and techniques devised by the aggressors, and rapid progress in combativeness and efficiency which is rather an ill omen for the US war and " Vietnamization" of the war!

# MILITARY OPERATIONS

G last week highlighted the following military actions:

DA NANG - CHU LAI AREA

FROM Jan. 4 to 6, FLAF men attacked about one hundred enemy bases and positions in the coastal provinces of Quang Nam, Quang Tis, Quang Naj, and Blab Dish, between the rath and the coastal provinces of Quang Mam, Quang Tis, Quang Mam, Quang Tis, Quang Mac Name, Candon Mang helicopter park, adozen sub-sector Cap, and many points d'app, and many points d'app. and many points d'appur around Da Nang and Che Lei, were hit by the patriotic forces. Let's mention the devastating raid on Cam Zol position, near Que Sen, about 40 km south of Da Nang and west-northwest of Chu Lai. PLAF commandos succeeded in storming this Ross Base (American name) and drub-(American name) and drubing the Gla garrisonod there in a hand-to-hand fight despite the numerical interiority of the PLAF units: 400 US marines of Regiment 7, US Division I, put out of action. The hattalion CP, two infantry companies, an artillery section, the whole radar lery section, the whole radar station and signal centre, were wiped out, o military vehicles (5 tanks) 2175 mm cannons, 10 recoilless guns and heavy machine-guns, about one hun-dred barracks, blockhouses and casemates destroyed, many fuel tanks and ammu-

tant booty including elec-tronic dectection and infrared apparatuses seized.

North of Quang Ngai, near Sen My, scene of the March 1968 massacre of over 500 civilians by the Gla, another 1968 massacre of 1968 massacre of over 500 massacre of 1968 massacr

WESTERN HIGH PLA-TEAUX, SAIGON REGION MEKONG DELTA

ORTH of the Western High Plateaux, from Jan. 5 to 8, the PLAF to 10 to 10 of action at least according to 10 of 10

Southwest of the Plateaux, in many onsets mounted on Jan. 6 in Phu Thien district, the PLAF wrote off the musterroll or decimated a puppet company and three platoons. In Tay Nish province (about one hundred kilometres northwest of Saigon), the PLAF inflicted

(Continued page 7)

#### MORE ON SAIGON WORKER'S GENERAL STRIKE

WORKER'S GENERAL STRIKE

Right on the morning
of January 7, two
important communication centres, namely the Tan
Son Nhat Airport and the
Saigon Port, were virtually
paralysed. At the commertial harbour, all loading
and unloabing operations
came to a standard! At the
military harbour argo ships
filled with war materials
were tirel down. At Pier 6, filled with war materials were tied down. At Pier 6, 18 other military ships faced the same situation. So did ships at several other piers.

Workers at Shell, Caltex and Esso refused to refuel air planes, causing the cancellation of nearly all flights from Tan Son Nhat Air port.

The general strike enlisted the support of large seg-ments of the Saigonose. A statement of support was issued by the Saigon General Association of Students.

#### NGUYEN VAN THIEU'S NEW YEAR MESSAGE

ON Jan. 8, 1070, puppet
President Nguyon Van
Thieu delivered a
New Year speech. On Jan.
9, he called a press conference to make public his
administration's 1070 prog-

Western agencies reported opinion Saigon

nothing new in his speech compared with the one he had delivered at the end of 1969. What was new was only its "harsher" tone as a only its "harsher" tone as a result of US Vice-President Agnew's visit to Saigon whose purpose it was to bol-ster up the tottering Saigon

namese youths who would die in place of American troops, in implementation of the White House's "Vietnamization".

Nguyen Van Thieu im-plored Nixon not to withdraw all the GIs in 1970: "This (total withdrawal)", he

of US combat troops will remain in South Viet Nam to help us defend the US logistic bases and support forces which are to stay behind."

In the same address, Nguyen Van Thieu endea-youred to white-wash the

#### HIRED HOOLIGANS

THE Saigon Senate recent-THE Saigon Senate recent-ly put to discussion a 16-page report on the Thicu-organized sacking of the Lower House on Dec. 20, 1959, Western agencies reported. It is well-known that this act of hooliganise was an incident which was an incident which spelled out the dissensions among US stopps in Salgen.
The report said that each of Salgen's wards was ordered by Thieu to contribute 10 members of the "popular defence" to that violent raid against the Lower House. Each ward received 200 piasters to cover transport expenses for "was paid too fosters. between various factions whereas each "demonstra-tor" was paid too plasters. The sackers were black uniforms and were armed with carbins and platols. They were led by Pho Thai Gia, Chairman of the Saigon City Council.

A Giai Phong Prets Agency correspondent in Saigon reported that a number of City Councillors revealed that that body had received from Thieu's wife a cheque from Thieu's wife a cheque of 3 million piasters as reward for the "demonstrators". A force of 200 thugs was conducted by the Secretary-General of the "Great Union Forces", a political party created by Thieu, and took part in the storming of the Lower Hosses or that dw. storming of the House on that day.

### SITUATION IN SAIGON

Nguyen Van Thieu once Nguyen Van Threu once again reiterated his "de-escalation from a position of atreight" argument, rejected all forms of coalition government and opposed a neutralist regime for South Viet Nam. In short, he showed readiness to continue belping his masters pursue their aggressive war against his own people.

He said, "We have first to beef up, consolidate and modernize our regular forces... and expand and strengthen our security forces..." In other words, he forces..." In other words, is would step up the compul-sory draft of South Vietsaid "cannot be feasible. It would be unrealistic, since we have only a limited troop strength. We need time for the training of our men. We need American equipment. We need time to train commanders for our newly formed units". His words betrayed the panic caused by US plans to his US-backed

Interestingly enough, some features of Nixon's tricky plan for troop withdrawals by dribblets were precisely revealed by Nguyen Van Thieu's speech. "In 1970," he said, "a number

US massacre of more than 500 civilians at Son My, which had been universally condemned. He said, "There may be some US individuals who killed some Viet-namese".

Nguyen Van Thieu only revealed himself as a true stooge of the US imperial-iats, lan instrument for the implementation of Nixon's plan to "Vietnamize" the war. The Saigen adminis-tration" ration's 1970 programme as indeed another sell-out.

SAIGON LOWER HOUSE SACKED BY THIEU-